The dual role of external corporate venturing in technological exploration by Vanhaverbeke, Wim et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The dual role of external corporate
venturing in technological exploration
Wim Vanhaverbeke and Ying Li and Vareska Van de Vrande




MPRA Paper No. 26488, posted 8. November 2010 10:49 UTC
 1
The dual role of external corporate venturing in 




Department BEW, Hasselt University, Belgium 
Vlerick Leuven Gent Management School, Belgium 
ESADE Business School, Spain 
 
Ying Li 
Technical University of Denmark 
DTU Executive School of Business 
DK-2800 Kgs. Lyngby, Denmark 
 
Vareska van de Vrande 
Rotterdam School of Management – Erasmus University, the Netherlands 
Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Switzerland 
 
Abstract 
Firms tend toward local search when they continue to build on own technological knowledge. 
Therefore, technological exploration has usually been associated with some form of boundary 
spanning activities. In line with previous research this study focuses on organizational or external 
boundary-spanning exploration, but in contrast to previous studies, it distinguishes between 
explorative learning from partners and from non-partners. Partners are considered as organizations 
with whom a focal firm has some kind of external venturing relations, i.e. technological alliances, 
corporate venturing capital, or M&As. Central in the study is the dual role of these external corporate 
venturing relations and their effect on the two types of exploration. In explorative learning from 
partners, the external venturing relationships function as pipes to exchange information between the 
partners. In explorative learning from non-partners, partners may play a role as prisms. That is, they 
inform the focal firm about technological opportunities beyond its current network. The results of the 
empirical analysis confirm the dual role of the partners in advancing the two types of explorative 
learning.  The results furthermore indicate that intermediate levels of technological distance between 
a focal firm and its partners foster explorative learning from partners, while low levels of 
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The importance of gaining knowledge from external sources to explore new technological and market 
opportunities has long been recognized in studies of innovation management, strategic alliances and 
corporate venturing (e.g., Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001; Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006; Schildt et al., 
2005; Keil et al., 2008). Companies increasingly use external corporate venturing to learn from 
knowledge sources beyond the boundary of the firm (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001). External 
corporate venturing, including corporate venture capital (CVC) investments (Dushnitsky and Lenox, 
2005; Keil et al., 2008), alliances (Gulati, 1998), and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) (Ahuja and 
Katila, 2001; Puranam and Srikanth, 2007) has been found to be positively related to the innovation 
performance of firms and has become a noteworthy vehicle for exploration (Schildt et al., 2005; Lavie 
and Rosenkopf, 2006; Lin et al., 2007). Exploration refers to the variation-seeking, risk-taking and 
experimentation-oriented learning of unfamiliar knowledge (March, 1991). At the firm level, 
exploration usually implies learning of new knowledge that does not reside within the firm. It has been 
suggested in the extant literature that by forming external venturing relationships with other 
organizations, an innovating firm can gain access to novel knowledge sources and explore new 
technological opportunities from its venturing partners (Chesbrough, 2003; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 
2001; Schildt et al., 2005; Keil et al., 2008).  
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However, innovating firms can not only explore new technologies from its corporate venturing 
partners, but it can also explore new technologies from organizations with whom they have had no 
prior venturing relationships. The former is indeed facilitated and governed directly by the venturing 
partnerships, while the latter could also be influenced by a firm’s external corporate venturing 
partnerships in an indirect way. When an innovating firm explores from organizations with whom it 
has no external venturing relations, the existing corporate venturing partnerships may nevertheless 
have impact on the exploratory learning of the innovating firm by acting, for instance, as an 
information pipe, a reputation reference, or a complementary knowledge source (Podolny, 2001; 
Gulati, 1998). Although prior studies have greatly contributed to our understanding of the relationship 
between external corporate venturing and exploration, they have mostly focused on a firm’s 
exploratory learning from its venturing partners. We call this “explorative learning from partners” or 
“ELP”. There has been little insight in how external corporate venturing may affect the exploratory 
learning beyond these venturing partnerships in reaching out to firms and organizations with whom an 
innovating company had or has no direct venturing relations. We will call this explorative learning 
from non-partners” or “ELN”. In other words, the extant literature has analyzed in detail the role of 
external corporate venturing partners with regard to external sources of knowledge, but we know little 
about how external corporate venturing partnerships could play a role in exploring technological 
knowledge embedded in other organizations with which the innovating firm has no venturing 
relationships.  
 
It is also unclear how external corporate venturing partnerships could affect ELP and ELN differently. 
Nevertheless, it is important to investigate this dual role of a firm’s external corporate venturing on 
explorative learning for several reasons. First, since firms are socially embedded within various social 
connections in an increasingly open innovation context, non- partnering organizations could be an 
equally important external source for exploration as venturing partners (Chesbrough, 2003, 2006; 
Rigby and Zook, 2002). Second, a firm’s external corporate venturing is highly relevant to its ELN 
because the venturing partnerships can serve for the innovating firm as a radar to detect new 
technological opportunities. They act as a prism (Podolny, 2001) to identify the relevance and 
complementarity of new technologies, and as a reputation mechanism to legitimize ELN. Finally, the 
quantity and quality of a firm’s existing venturing relationships might alter the incentives and 
constrain the resources for ELN. Hence, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of 
external corporate venturing, including corporate venture capital (CVC), alliances and mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A), on both types of explorative learning – exploration from partners and non-
partners. Besides the direct benefit of having access to external venturing partners’ technologies an 
innovating firm may also benefit from its partners’ knowledge and reputation to explore new external 
knowledge sources beyond its partners. 
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This study makes several contributions to the corporate venturing and inter-organizational learning 
literature. First, to our knowledge, this paper is among the first to conceptually distinguish explorative 
learning from partners (ELP) and explorative learning from non-partners (ELN). Second, it empirically 
investigates the potentially different effects of external venturing on a firm’s ELP and ELN. The 
results of this study will extend our understanding on external corporate venturing and innovation. 
Third, it also theoretically explores and empirically tests the relationships between the levels of 
integration in the venturing governance modes and EFP and EBP. Finally, we also take into account 
the possible influence of technological distance (Nooteboom, 2000a) on the exploratory learning in 
combination with the effects of external corporate venturing. Consequently, the results of this study 
provide new insights for the literature on inter-organizational learning in general and for the prevailing 
stream of research on exploration in particular.  
 
This paper is organized as follows. First, we introduce the concept of exploration and exploitation and 
explain the difference between explorative learning from partners and non-partners. We also illustrate 
how most studies in the literature on exploration have limited their focus on the inter-organizational 
learning between venturing partners. The role of the partners in facilitating explorative learning from 
non-partners has been largely neglected. Third, we provide a theoretical background for external 
corporate venturing and develop hypotheses on the relationships between corporation venturing and 
explorative learning from partners and non-partners. Next, we present the data and estimation methods 
to test the hypotheses. Finally, we discuss the results and draw some conclusions from our research, 
followed by suggestions for future research.  
 
 
2 Theory and hypotheses 
 
2.1 The dual role of external corporate venturing partnerships in technological exploration 
The notions of exploration and exploitation have been widely used in studies on organizational 
learning, strategic renewal and technological innovation. March (1991) described the two concepts as 
follows: ‘exploration includes things captured by terms such as search, variation, risk taking, 
experimentation, flexibility, discovery, and innovation. Exploitation refers to such things as 
refinement, choice, production, efficiency, selection, implementation, and execution (March, 1991, p. 
71). Exploration is variation-seeking, risk-taking and experimentation oriented. Exploitation is variety-
reducing and efficiency oriented (March, 1991). In this paper, we focus on exploration and, in line 
with Rosenkopf and Nerkar (2001), we start from the observation that in order to move beyond local 
search exploration requires organizational boundary spanning. These authors claim that technological 
exploration in firms requires learning from other organizations.  We refine the concept of external 
boundary spanning exploration by distinguishing two types of external sources from whom the 
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innovating firm can learn.  Companies can go beyond local search by sourcing new technology from 
its external corporate venturing partners. However, companies can also learn from companies with 
whom it had no venturing relations before.  In making this distinction between partners and non-
partners, we create a new typology of boundary spanning exploration which will be instrumental in 
understanding the dual role of external corporate venturing partners in explaining technological 
exploration. 
 
Previous research has shown that firms with stronger reliance on their own prior developments have a 
stronger innovation performance, but they risk that their technological competencies become less 
relevant as newly emerging technologies are not detected in time. Firms can further build and exploit 
existing technological competencies through internal R&D. However, researchers also argued that this 
internal orientation leads to the development of competency traps (Levitt and March, 1988; Levinthal 
and March, 1993) and core rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1992, 1995). Firms have to acquire 
technological knowledge from external partners  and the gains related to the internal development of 
technology are not sustainable unless the organization can assimilate and integrate knowledge that is 
developed externally (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001; Sidhu et al., 2004). Exploration is usually 
recognized as activities that search for unfamiliar, distant and remote knowledge (Ahuja and Lampert, 
2001; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001; Benner and Tushman, 2002; Katila and Ahuja, 2002; Nerkar, 
2003). The underlying logic is that a firm’s reuse of internal knowledge aims at refining, improving 
and exploiting existing technological knowledge, while searching and acquiring new knowledge 
outside of the firm is regarded as tentative, unfamiliar, uncertain and exploratory (Katila and Ahuja, 
2002; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001). Knowledge sourcing from other firms is crucial for exploration 
as innovations are considered the result of a recombination of component elements (Schumpeter, 
1934; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Kogut and Zander, 1992). Firms can find and assimilate new 
technological knowledge from other companies because firms differ from each other in many ways, 
such as market orientation, manufacturing facilities, distribution channels, skills developed in 
application technology and market launches of new products, technological capabilities and so forth 
(Dosi, 1988). Differences in firms’ knowledge bases is a crucial condition for learning and for 
producing Schumpeterian 'novel combinations' (Nelson and Winter, 1982). A few studies on corporate 
venturing and strategic alliances consider exploitation as the reuse and refinement of a firm’s existing 
knowledge base, while exploration is considered as a learning process to integrate new technologies 
from a firm’s venturing partners (Benner and Tushman, 2002; Schildt et al., 2005; Lavie and 
Rosenkopf, 2006). These venturing partnerships may have different governance modes, including 
corporate venture capital investment, strategic alliances, joint ventures, and mergers and acquisitions 
(Keil et al., 2008; Van de Vrande et al., 2009). Although the role of venturing partners in technological 
exploration has been acknowledged in the existing literature, scholars have only investigated how an 
innovating firm can learn from its partners, but they overlooked the possibility that a firm may utilize 
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the same external venturing relationships to explore new technologies beyond the existing venturing 
partnerships.  
 
We draw on the extant literature about technological innovations to define two types of exploration—
explorative learning from partners (ELP) and from non-partners (ELN). Both types of exploration are 
related to organizational boundary spanning learning (Sorenson and Stuart, 2000; Rosenkopf and 
Nerkar, 2001). Explorative learning from partners (ELP) results from the fact that innovating firms 
learn directly from their external corporate venturing relationships. That is, firms can explore new 
technologies or competencies by establishing corporate venturing relationships that determine how the 
transfer or co-creation of the technology will be managed and organized. A pharmaceutical company 
might for instance establish an R&D agreement with a biotechnology start-up to learn about the 
specific knowledge of the latter in a particular application of functional genomics. In this case, we 
expect that the new technology developed in the pharmaceutical company will be partly based on the 
technology of the start-up company. Explorative learning from non-partners (ELN), however, is 
another type of boundary spanning exploration. ELN is an explorative learning process in which the 
innovating company is not learning directly from its external corporate venturing relationships, but the 
company is exploring new technological areas relying on existing technological knowledge of other 
organizations with whom it has no venturing partnerships. A firm can learn from non-partners in 
different ways: scientific publications (McMillan et al., 2000), patent releases, contact with 
consultants and intermediaries (Howells, 2006), product introductions in the market, conferences, 
exhibitions, benchmarking with competitors (Wiersema and Bowen, 2008; Hunt and Morgan, 1997), 
mobility of personnel, etc. are just a few ways how exploration in a firm can be based on knowledge 
of organizations with whom the innovating company has not established any formal collaboration.  
 
In explorative learning from partners an innovating firm is learning from its venturing partners 
directly. Their technological competences or knowledge base is the primary reason why the focal firm 
engages in technology alliances, invests in a portfolio firm as a corporate investor or acquires 
companies with interesting technologies. The venturing relations can thus be considered as ‘pipes’ 
through which the knowledge interactions between partners is shaped and facilitated (Podolny, 2001). 
This role of venturing relations has been extensively explained in the literature.  
 
On the other hand, companies can avoid local search by exploring from organizations with which they 
have had no prior external corporate venturing relationships. This can be referred to as ‘explorative 
learning from non-partners (ELN). The extant literature has noticed the importance of this type of 
learning (Beckman et al., 2004; Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006), but has overlooked the role of the 
external corporate venturing partners in facilitating this type of explorative learning (Schildt, et al., 
2005; Keil et al. 2008).   
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For instance, Schildt et al. (2005, 501) intentionally excluded patents that do not refer to the patents of 
a venture partner but to other organizations because “they are not considered as constituting 
interorganizational learning”. We argue that there are many reasons to believe that it is important to 
link a firm’s existing external venturing relationships to its explorative learning from non-partners. In 
other words, how can technology partners play a role in a firm’s explorative learning beyond its 
existing network of venturing partners? First, an innovating firm is embedded in a broader social 
network of firms with which it is directly or indirectly connected via the venturing partnerships 
(Granovetter, 1985). The social embeddedness of firms provides an innovating firm not only with 
access to the knowledge base of its venturing partners to which it’s directly connected, but also the 
possibility to reach out to the knowledge base of other firms which are known by or connected to the 
focal firm’s venturing partners (Davis, 1991; Burt, 1992). In other words, the external venturing 
partnerships may increase the likelihood of knowledge spillover from other firms to the focal firm 
(Meyer, 2004; Chang and Xu, 2008). The external corporate venturing relationships can be regarded as 
the channels to reach beyond the boundary of an innovating firm’s direct corporate venturing networks 
to a larger range of firms and a broader knowledge pool (Gulati, 1998; Beckman et al., 2004; Lin et 
al., 2007). Second, due to their unique knowledge base, external corporate venturing partners may 
help the innovating firm to find novel technologies. When novel technologies are spotted, external 
corporate venturing partners may further act as a knowledge reference to identify the relevance and 
complementarity of the knowledge for the innovating firm (Burt, 1992; Nooteboom, 2000a). In other 
words, external corporate venturing partnerships may act as a radar to detect relevant knowledge 
beyond a firm’s network of venturing partners and they act as referrals concerning the usefulness of 
the new knowledge. Last but not least, the relationships between the innovating firm and its external 
venturing partners may affect third party’s perceptions of the relative trustworthiness, organizational 
capabilities and performance of the innovating firm (Podolny, 2001). For instance, if the innovating 
firm has an external corporate venturing relationship with a firm having superior reputation and 
performance, other firms with complementary technologies will perceive the innovating firm as with 
great capability, competence and trustworthiness (Gulati, 1995; Nooteboom, 2000b). This, in turn, 
raises the odds for the innovating firm to explore new technological opportunities with firms with 
whom it had no venturing relationships before. In other words, external venturing partnerships may act 
as a ‘prism’ for other firms to evaluate the value of the innovating firm, which, in turn, affects the 
choice and success for the innovating firm to explore beyond its external corporate venturing network 
(Burt, 1992). 
 
Combining these two types of explorative learning with the network of a firm’s external corporate 
venturing partnerships creates the possibility to distinguish two roles for the latter in relation to 
explorative learning. First, increasing the number of external corporate venturing partnerships will 
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directly increase a firm’s technological exploration from these venturing partners. Second, even when 
an innovating firm is not relying on the technological capabilities of its partners to explore new 
technologies, the venturing partners may still have a role to play in facilitating the exploratory learning 
of the focal firm from other firms with whom it has no venturing relations. We know little about how a 
firm’s exploratory learning from its venture partners (as one type of inter-firm relationship) may 
influence the exploratory learning from other social actors with whom the focal firm has no venturing 
relationships. In the following section, we investigate the different effects of external corporate 
venturing partnerships on ELP and ELN.    
  
2.2 Corporate venturing and exploratory learning 
Corporate venturing has been recognized as a main source for firms to get access to external 
technology. Companies are increasingly using corporate venturing to gain technological knowledge 
beyond their boundaries. They have choices between  different forms of corporate venturing. Each of 
these venturing relations has a specific governance mode offering the innovating company in this way 
a range of venturing relations with different levels of integration (Schildt et al., 2005). These venturing 
forms include corporate venture capital, non-equity alliances, equity alliances (including joint 
ventures), and mergers and acquisitions.  
 
Corporate venturing investments (CVC) are usually flexible investments to get access to the 
knowledge of start-ups (Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005). Investments in innovative start-ups may 
provide the corporation with and ensure a stake in novel technological opportunities. Non-equity 
alliances, including licensing, second-sourcing, distribution agreements and technology exchange 
agreements, refer to those technology agreements which do not involve an equity investment in the 
partner firm. Non-equity alliances are largely based on flexible contractual agreements. In contrast, 
equity alliances refer to those alliances that require either shared ownership, independent 
administrative, operational and incentive system (joint ventures), or one or more partners taking an 
equity stake in other partners’ ownership (minority holdings) (Gulati and Singh, 1998). Both non-
equity and equity alliances have been found to be positively related to firms’ innovation performance 
because they enable firms to learn from their allied partners through various levels of cooperation 
(Stuart, 2000; Hagedoorn and Duysters 2002). Alliances that are established in order to search for new 
technologies from partners usually result in positive exploratory performance (Rothaermel, 2001; 
Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). Finally, merger and acquisitions (M&As) allow the acquiring firm to 
get access to and absorb the knowledge from the acquired firms through ownership control. Prior 
research also found positive relationship between M&A and innovative performance (Ahuja and 
Katila, 2001; Keil, et al., 2008; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2002).   
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Scholars have found empirical evidence that external venturing partnerships have a direct positive 
effect on exploratory learning from these partner firms (ELP) (Schildt et al., 2005; Keil, et al., 2008; 
Van de Vrande et al., 2007). There are several reasons why we believe external venturing partnerships 
are also positively related to what we call explorative learning from non-partners (ELN). First, inter-
firm networks are considered a potential source of learning (Levitt and March, 1988). Networks enable 
forums for discussion, direct attention to new practices, and facilitate the transmission of information 
(Beckman and Haunschild, 2002). With venturing relationships, a company can get connected to a 
much larger range of firms who are directly or indirectly connected with its venturing partners. This 
enlarged network of contacts  serves as a conduit for technological information, which in turn may 
lead to the development of new technological capabilities (Davis, 1991). Hence, the possibilities of 
ELN increase when a firm has a large number of venturing relationships. Second, external corporate 
venturing partners may help the innovating firm to find novel technologies and to identify relevant and 
complementary knowledge with regard to its existing knowledge base (Burt, 1992; Nooteboom, 
2000a). Finally, a firm with many external venturing partnerships could be considered as having a 
strong reputation and having control over strong innovation capabilities (Ibarra, 1993; Lin et al., 
2007). External corporate venturing partnerships may signal to other firms the reputation and the 
technological capabilities of the innovating firm. External corporate venturing relations with 
prominent partners will facilitate the access to the technologies capabilities and expertise of other 
firms’ with whom the innovating firm has no venturing relation. Hence, venturing partnerships might 
affect the success of the innovating firm to explore beyond the external corporate venturing 
relationships (Burt, 1992). Therefore, we expect that firms that are rich in external corporate venturing 
partnerships will be more likely to undertake ELP as well as ELN than those firms with few corporate 
venturing partnerships. Accordingly, we hypothesize 
 
Hypothesis 1a: The number of external corporate venturing relations is positively related to a firm’s 
explorative learning from partners (ELP). 
Hypothesis 1b: The number of external corporate venturing relations is positively related to a firm’s 
explorative learning from non-partners (ELN).  
 
Although we expect a positive relationship between the external corporate venturing of an innovating 
firm and its exploratory learning,  we might question whether the strength of this effect differs 
between the two types of exploration. First, external corporate venturing partnerships provide the 
innovating firm with direct connections and formalized relations with its partners. The exchange of 
knowledge between the innovating firm and its partners (ELP) is based on a certain level of reciprocity 
(Kachra and White, 2008) and regulated by a particular contractual agreement (Gulati, 1998). The 
contractual arrangements are instrumental in optimizing the technological cooperation and transfer of 
knowledge.  
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External corporate venturing partnerships also provide the innovating firm with some possibilities to 
get connected indirectly to other firms. Even if the innovating firm explores beyond the venturing 
partnerships via the connections of its venturing partners, the knowledge exchange between the 
innovating firm and other firms is not based on a contractual agreement as in the case for its external 
corporate venturing partnerships. Although external corporate venturing partnerships may enable an 
innovating firm to get connected indirectly to a much larger network of companies, these indirect 
relations, with are typical for ELN, are (by definition) not formalized by a contractual agreement. This 
in turn leads to a less controllable way to assimilate and integrate knowledge from these companies. 
Second, although a great number of external corporate venturing partners may increase the chance that 
novel and complementary technological knowledge beyond the venturing partnerships will be 
identified and effectively utilized by the innovating firm, this might not always be the case because the 
innovating firm has to rely on the network resources and technological capabilities of its venturing 
partners (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). A firm’s corporate venturing partners vary in terms of 
their size, age, competitive position, product diversity, financial resources, etc. (Shan, 1990; Burgers et 
al., 1993) and their capabilities to facilitate the innovating firm to undertake ELN may differ as well. 
Finally, an innovating firm with many external venturing partnerships may be conceived by other 
firms as competitive in many industries and markets. Thus, firms, which have no venturing 
relationships with the innovating firm, may consider the former as a potential competitor and prevent 
their technologies from spilling over to the innovating focal firm (Schrader, 1991; Chang and Xu, 
2008). In sum, we expect that the positive effect of external corporate venturing will be larger for ELP 
than for ELN. Accordingly, we hypothesize, 
 
Hypothesis 1c:  The positive impact of the number of corporate venturing relations on ELP is stronger 
than on ELN.  
 
2.3 Governance modes of corporate venturing and exploratory learning 
External corporate ventures differ in terms of governances modes. This implies that innovating firms 
have the choice between different levels of hierarchical control and intensity of integration. Prior 
research on contract choices in corporate venturing has been influenced primarily by the transaction 
cost theory (Gulati, 1998). Two key dimensions of transaction cost economy are assets specificity and 
uncertainty (Williamson 1975, 1985). Assets specificity refers to the assets that are invested in a 
particular transaction and cannot be easily redeployed to another transaction. Uncertainty refers to the 
fact that relevant contingencies of a transaction are too unpredictable to be specified ex ante in a 
transaction (environmental uncertainty) or the performance of a transaction cannot easily be verified 
ex post (behavioral uncertainty). When firms deal with specific assets under uncertainty, they have to 
safeguard the transaction against partners’ potential opportunistic behavior (Williamson 1985, 1991, 
1996). In addition to safeguarding transaction hazards, relational risks such as holds-up risks and spill-
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over risks (Nooteboom 2004a, 2004b) exist in various alliances relationships. Holds-up risks (lock-
in/out) results from the interdependence of organizations and relational-specific investments. Spill-
over risks (i.e. learning races) emerge as a consequence of the knowledge asymmetry between firms 
whose relationships are never exclusively cooperative or competitive (Nooteboom 2004a, 2004b, 
Gulati et al. 2000). The interactive nature of innovation and organizational learning requires 
appropriate governance to realize the potential of inter-organizational relationships and control the 
relational risks.  
 
The different governance modes of external corporate venturing we introduced in this paper (CVC, 
equity and non-equity alliances and M&A) can be ranked according to the degree of integration 
between the partners. As noted by Powell and Brantley (1992), innovating firms collaborate with each 
other using different types of interorganizational contracting that fall between arms-length market 
transactions and vertical integration. Previous studies have argued that these modes of collaboration 
can be ranked along the continuum between arms-length transactions and a fully integrated solution 
(Gulati and Singh, 1998; Hagedoorn and Sadowski, 1999; Nielsen, 2000; Santoro and McGill, 2005; 
Villalonga and McGahan, 2005). In line with this idea of a continuum CVCs can be considered as the 
type of partnership that resemble most arms-length relationships among all these governance modes. 
M&As, on the contrary, requires a full integration between the acquirer and acquired firm (Schildt et 
al., 2005; Van de Vrande et al., 2009). Alliances are positioned in the middle of the continuum. For 
non-equity alliances, coordination among partners is based on a contract. Members of the partners 
work jointly on behave of their own organization. Equity alliances represent a somewhat more 
integrated form of governance because of the equity investments of the partners. In the case of joint 
ventures there is a separate entity created by alliance partners. It requires not only specific equity 
investments, but also a tight coordination between alliance partners because a separate administrative, 
operational and incentive system needs to be established (Gulati and Singh, 1998). Empirical evidence 
shows that governance modes that appropriately aligned with the transaction requirements lead to 
enhanced performance (Geyskens et al., 2006). As exploration entails high levels of uncertainty, less 
integrated governance modes are more likely to be the appropriate for exploration (Schilt et al., 2005; 
Van de Vrande et al., 2009; Gilsing and Nooteboom 2006). However, the relationship between the 
integration levels of governance modes in external venturing on the one hand and a firm’s explorative 
learning from partners (ELP) and explorative learning from non-partners (ELN) on the other hand, 
has received little attention in the literature. 
 
The existing literature has argued that higher levels of integration in the governance modes of external 
corporate venturing are less likely to lead to explorative learning from partners because of the 
uncertain nature of the returns to this type of learning (compared to exploitative learning), and the 
uncertainty ex ante about the strategic importance and operational relatedness of the ventures (Schildt, 
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et al., 2005; Van de Vrande, et al., 2006). In this case, innovating firms tends to form venturing 
partnerships using governance modes with low levels of commitment in order to remain flexible. In a 
similar vein, we argue that (low) high levels of integration in the governance modes of external 
corporate venturing may lead to (more) less explorative learning from non-partners. High levels of 
integration in governance modes entail more specific investments in the venturing relationships. This 
implies that  the innovating firm has less flexibility to step out of existing venturing relationships. This 
flexibility might be necessary in the case of explorative learning from non-partners, because 
technological opportunities may change recurrently. As a result, an innovating firm can profit from 
loose ties with its partners, which it can easily establish or dissolve when new technological 
opportunities emerge: a changing portfolio of partners will inform a company about new  technologies 
and market opportunities. When an innovating firm is tied to its partners through highly integrated 
venturing relations which are hard to reverse, it may not have the required flexibility to explore new 
opportunities as it is linked for a longer time to partners through strong ties (Gilsing and Nooteboom, 
2006). Therefore, we expect that a firm having a corporate venturing portfolio with high levels of 
integration will be performing less well in explorative learning from non-partners. Accordingly, we 
hypothesize  
 
Hypothesis 2a: Lower levels of integration of the governance modes of external corporate venturing 
will increase a firm’s performance on ELP and ELN.  
 
However, contrary to the arguments above, the theory of transaction cost economics (TCE) argues that 
exchange relationships between firms with high uncertainty will prefer highly integrated governance 
modes to control the transaction hazards and the risks of spillovers (Williamson 1975, 1991). Since 
exploratory learning between firms is highly uncertain in terms of returns, TCE predicts that 
exploration from partners requires hierarchical and integrative governance modes (Pisano, 1989, Van 
de Vrande, et al., 2006). There are also reasons to expect that not only ELP but also ELN may benefit 
from high levels of integration in the governance modes of venturing partnerships. Partners inform the 
innovating firm about opportunities beyond the corporate venturing network and the question is 
whether the governance mode has an impact on the richness and the quality of the information. In 
other words, is the information that is revealed through CVCs, alliances or M&As different? Is the 
innovating company informed in a different way through the different types of corporate venturing 
relations? And if so, how does the level of integration of these modes affect the information about 
opportunities beyond the corporate venturing network? Different governance modes provide the 
innovating firm with different types of information about technological opportunities because partners 
are different and they might focus on technologies in different stages of the technology life cycle. 
Integrated modes also offer more fine-grained information about the opportunities compared to less 
integrated modes. As a result, we argue that more integrated modes will lead to rich and adequate 
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information between an innovating firm and its partners, which, in turn will inform the former more 
accurately about opportunities beyond the existing network. In this way the innovating firm can 
increase its explorative learning from non-partners. For these reasons, we formulate an alternative 
hypothesis to Hypothesis 2a: 
 
Hypothesis 2b:  Higher levels of integration of the governance modes of external corporate venturing 
will increase a firm’s performance on ELP and ELN. 
 
2.4 Technological distance 
Another important factor that is likely to affect explorative learning from partners and non-partners is 
the technological distance between the focal firm and its venturing partners (Ahuja and Lampert, 
2001; Nerkar and Roberts, 2004; Phene et al., 2006). Due to different experiences, technologies, 
markets and organizational histories, organizations have different foci, which yield the cognitive 
distance between organizations (Nooteboom, 1999, 2000a, 2004b). Technological distance reflects the 
technological dimension of the cognitive distance among firms. It provides firms with possibilities to 
explore novel combinations of technologies. Firms with large technological distance are more likely to 
get access to complementary information, resources and knowledge, which in turn will result in more 
exploration. However, firms also need sufficient organizational capabilities to digest novel knowledge 
and to develop it into marketable products or processes. At the firm level, this critical organizational 
capability has been recognized as absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Absorptive 
capacity includes organizational capabilities to assimilate externally developed information, to 
internally distribute it, and implement knowledge in various activities. On the one hand, learning takes 
place where there are differences in knowledge. On the other hand, too large cognitive distance makes 
basic mutual understanding unachievable (Gilsing and Duysters, 2008). Many studies have found that 
though difference in knowledge base of innovation partners is a crucial condition leading to inter-
organizational innovation (Nelson and Winter, 1982), it also has a negative effect on absorptive 
capacity because it creates learning problems resulting from the lack of basic mutual understanding 
between each other. For instance, Stuart (1998) argues that the most valuable alliances are those with 
similar knowledge foci and/or operating in similar markets, whereas distant firms are inhibited from 
cooperating effectively. Similarly, the diversification literature argues that firms learn most from 
alliance partners with related knowledge and skills (Tanriverdi and Venkatraman, 2005). These studies 
have revealed the importance of cooperation between firms with a minimum degree of similarity in 
their knowledge base in order to maintain sufficient absorptive capacity. 
 
Given the possible positive effect of knowledge difference on novelty and the possible negative effect 
on firms’ absorptive capacity, the combined effect of cognitive distance on innovation is expected to 
be a curvilinear function of innovation performance (Figure 1).  
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 Insert here Figure 1 
 
One can expect that in the case of ELP, innovating firms should hold a moderate level technological 
distance with their external corporate venturing partners because too small technological distance 
provides little novelty for learning and too large technological distance endangers the exploratory 
learning by diminishing the absorptive capacity of firms. Accordingly, we hypothesize 
 
Hypothesis 3: The technological distance between the innovating firm and its external corporate 
venturing partners has a curvilinear effect (inverted U-shape) on ELP. 
 
Technological distance between the innovating firm and its external corporate venturing partners can 
also have an effect on explorative learning from non-partners (ELN). The argumentation is however 
different from the one we developed for learning from partners (ELP). The central question here is 
how technological distance between the innovating firm and its corporate venturing partners plays a 
role in making the focal firm aware of interesting organizations beyond its own network with strong 
competencies in relevant or newly emerging technologies. How are corporate venturing partners 
instrumental in getting knowledgeable about these technological capabilities? Are partners at short or 
large technological distance more helpful in facilitating explorative learning from non-partners?  
 
An innovating firm will avoid two extremes because they are not interesting in terms of explorative 
learning. First, a firm has sufficient absorptive capacity to detect, access and assimilate technology 
from non-allied organizations that are highly related to its own technology base. In this case, partners 
are simply redundant. Second, partners at large technological distance from the focal firm may not be 
helpful in providing information about organizations with a technology base that is at large 
technological distance from their own technological competencies and those of the focal firm. It is 
more promising when the partners are familiar with the technology of the focal firm or with that of the 
firm organizations whom the focal firm can learn from. If there is a relative large distance between a 
partner and the focal firm, the former can inform the latter about the technologies of organizations that 
are operating in the same or related technological fields as the partner. The focal firm will however 
experience problems in learning from its partner about this opportunity because it is not sufficiently 
experienced in the technology of the partner or its connections. In contrast, when the partner is 
working in similar technological areas it speaks has similar scientific and technological roots as the 
focal firm and, as a consequence, communication about technological opportunities outside the 
existing venturing network will be detailed and unbiased. Moreover, partners at relative short 
technological distances might also be active in markets that are supporting or adjacent to the focal 
firm’s markets. Therefore, they can better evaluate technological opportunities and the commercial 
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benefit the focal firm can reap from it. In addition, when partners are taking part in the same economic 
ecosystem of value creating system, they may have a greater incentive to spur the focal firm to get 
connected to organizations with strong technologies. In short, we argue that innovating firms can learn 
more easily from non-partners through partners that have a similar technology base as the focal firms. 
Accordingly, we hypothesize 
 
Hypothesis 4: The technological distance between the focal innovating firm and its external corporate 
venturing partners has a negative effect on ELN. 
 
 
3 Data, variables and method 
 
3.1 Data and sample 
To test our hypotheses, we use a sample consisting of 153 firms that were active in the pharmaceutical 
industry between 1990 and 2000. The dataset was constructed in the following way. For each year of 
the observation period, the largest 200 companies in the industry were collected. The pharmaceutical 
industry consists of mainly two types of firms: generic drug companies and innovators. To distinguish 
between those, the selection was based on firms’ prior patents in the pharmaceutical industry. That is, 
the selection was based on patents filed in the following patent classes 424, 435, 436, 514, 530, 536, 
800, and 9301 as defined by the USPTO (Rothaermel and Hess, 2007; Rothaermel and Thursby, 2007). 
Large organizations are more likely to engage in external technology sourcing activities and are more 
likely to report them publicly (Keil et al., 2008). Prior research on alliances and acquisitions has for 
that reason also focused on the largest organizations in the industry (Ahuja, 2000; Gulati, 1995; Gulati 
and Garguilo, 1999; Hitt et al., 1991, 1997; Keil et al., 2008). After selecting the companies with 
patents in the relevant patent classes, research institutes and universities were removed from the 
sample. Next, the remaining sample was manually checked for parents and affiliates using Dun & 
Bradstreet's Who Owns Whom, which were then aggregated on the parent company level. After 
checking for duplicates, this leads to 153 independent companies to be included in the sample. We will 
refer to these independent companies as "focal firms", to distinguish them from their partners.  
 
Next, we have gathered for these firms all the venture capital investments, technology alliances, 
minority holdings, joint ventures, and merger and acquisition activities during the period of 1985-
2000, which allows us to calculate some of the independent variables using a five-year time lag. 
                                                          
1
  The description of the patent classes is as follows: 424: drug, bio-affecting and body treating compositions; 
435: chemistry: molecular biology and microbiology; 436: chemistry: analytical and immunological testing; 
514: drug, bio-affecting and body treating compositions; 530: chemistry: natural resins or derivatives; 
peptides or proteins; lignins or reaction products thereof; 536: organic compounds; 800: multicellular living 
organisms and unmodified parts thereof and related processes; 930: peptide or protein sequence. 
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Furthermore, we collected patent data and financial information. Corporate venture capital data was 
derived from the Thomson VentureXpert database. Data concerning alliances and joint ventures was 
obtained from the MERIT-CATI databank on Cooperative Agreements and Technology Indicators 
(Hagedoorn, 1993). We used Thomson ONE Banker to collect information regarding the companies' 
M&A activity. Both the collected alliances and corporate venture capital investments have a strong 
technology component, therefore, to make a consistent sample selection for all types of governance 
modes, we only included technological M&As in our sample, following the method by Ahuja and 
Katila (2001)2. 
 
Patent information was collected for all firms included in our sample using data from the US Patent 
and Trademark Office. Because the US Patent and Trademark Office grants patents both on subsidiary 
and on parent company level (Patel and Pavitt, 1997), and the organizational level on which patents 
are applied for differs between companies, we consolidated the patents on parent company level for 
each observation year, using Who Owns Whom by Dun & Bradstreet. In addition to that, we gathered 
financial data using Worldscope, including sales, research and development expenses and the number 





We make a distinction between two types of dependent variables: explorative learning from partners 
(ELP) on the one hand and explorative learning from non-partners (ELN) on the other hand. We refer 
to Figure 2 to explain the distinction between both variables in detail. This figure illustrates how we 
can categorize different types of learning by tracking the backward citations of new patents of an 
innovating firm in a particular year. When companies build on prior technological knowledge, new 
patents must cite existing patents on which it builds. As a result, patent citations provide us with a 
unique and reliable instrument to define different types of exploration. This taxonomy is based on the 
assumption that when firms innovate, they usually build on existing technologies developed by their 
own or by other organizations (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Katila, 2002)3.  
                                                          
2
    The method employed in this paper is slightly different from the method by Ahuja and Katila (2001). Ahuja 
and Katila (2001) included also deals for which they found press releases indicating technology as a specific 
motivation for undertaking the M&A. Since we had no access to these press releases, we could only include 
deals in which the partner has applied for at least one patent in the 5 years prior to the acquisition. 
3
  We use patents and patent citations as a proxy for knowledge and knowledge flows. In line with the work of 
others (e.g., Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Almeida, 1996; Hoetker & Agarwal, 2007; Jaffe et al., 1993; Peri, 2005). 
Knowledge may flow between individuals and firms through a number of mechanisms including conferences, 
publications, professional social networks, reverse engineering in addition to patent reviews. Despite the 
various mechanisms for knowledge flow, knowledge and knowledge flows often leave their footprint in the 
form of patents (Jaffe, 1986). As a result, patents are an effective proxy for knowledge regardless of the 
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 Insert here Figure 2 
 
In some cases, firms invent completely new technologies not building on any prior art. These so called 
pioneering technologies have no technological antecedents and they represent the technologies that do 
not build on any existing technologies (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001). Pioneering technologies are 
interesting as they may have a disruptive effect on existing technologies, but they fall beyond the 
scope of this paper (Van de Vrande et al., 2006; Kleinschmidt and Cooper, 1991). We can further 
distinguish two different cases when a firm’s new patent cites prior patents. On the one hand, a new 
patent can cite some of the firm’s own patents. This implies that the new patent is built on the firm’s 
prior expertise and experience and, as a result, the patent will have one or more self-citations. This 
type of patents is usually regarded as exploitative learning (Benner and Tushman, 2002; Rosenkopf 
and Nerkar, 2001; Schildt et al., 2005). By exploitation, firms deepen and refine their current technical 
capabilities that are most likely the important competencies underlying the current businesses of these 
firms. In other cases a firm can also successfully file new patents that do not cite any of its own prior 
art. When an innovating firm’s new patents have no backward self-citations, the firm explores new 
technological areas and broadens its own technological capabilities by building on the knowledge 
from other organizations. Patents with no self-citations but citing patents from other firms are 
considered to be more explorative than those that also cite own prior technology. These patents are 
important to avoid problems related to a strong dependence on local search (March and Simon, 1958; 
Nelson and Winter, 1982; Helfat, 1994).   
 
So far, we have only been summarizing some of the existing definitions of technological exploitation 
and exploration. This study contributes to the literature by further segmenting the exploratory patents 
into two subcategories. On the one hand, innovating firms may avoid local search by learning from 
their venturing partners. These venturing partners are connected to the innovating firm by various 
venturing relationships, including corporate venture capital, strategic alliances, joint ventures or 
M&As. A patent is categorized as an ELP-patent when there are no self-citations and when some 
backward citations refer to those organizations that have venturing relationships with the innovating 
firm during the last 5 years (Benner and Tushman, 2002; Schildt, et al., 2005). On the contrary, a 
patent is categorized as an ELN-patent when there are no self-citations and when there are only 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
mechanism. The fact that examiners add citations to patent applications is not really a concern here. 
Independent examiners are involved in assessing the prior knowledge on which an innovation builds. One 
may criticize that these citations included by examiners do not reveal how a firm is building its technology on 
that of other companies. However, we feel comfortable that this is not a major issue for two reasons. First, as 
we mentioned already, learning is not necessarily based on explicit patent reviews. Second, in case we would 
consider those citations as random noise, then we can argue that if the empirical results in this paper reveal 
interesting relations, then they would be a priori hold in case we could eliminated the patent citations that the 
patent examiners added. Moreover, these extra citations lead to a better measure of the knowledge that an 
innovation actually builds upon. 
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backward citations referring to organizations with whom the innovating firm had no venturing 
relationships during the last 5 years. More specifically, we counted for every observation year t the 
number of times each technology-sourcing mode was established in the five years prior to the 
observation year (t-1 to t-5). This moving window approach is considered to be an appropriate 
timeframe during which the existing portfolio of external technology activities is likely to have an 
influence on the current technological performance of a firm (Kogut, 1988, 1989; Gulati, 1995). 
 
Both dependent variables are count variables, indicating the number of new patent applications that 
fulfill r the requirements of an ELP or ELN-patent. Explorative learning from partners is calculated as 
the sum of patents successfully applied for per year by the focal firm4, which have at least one citation 
to its partner’s prior patents, but no citations to its own prior patents. Explorative learning from non-
partners, on the other hand, is calculated as the number of patents successfully applied for per year by 
the focal firm which neither cites its own prior patents nor its partners’ prior patents.  
 
In our sample, there are 171,532 patents in total, of which 101,228 can be categorized as exploitative 




Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 1c, 2a and 2b predict a direct positive effect of CVC investments, non-equity 
alliances, equity alliances, M&As on ELP as well as on ELN. Therefore, for every observation year t, 
we counted the number of CVC investments, non-equity alliances, equity alliances and M&As 
respectively in the five years prior to the observation year (t-1 to t-5). We took a five year moving 
window in line with the arguments developed above. This variables measure the effect of corporate 
venturing on the two types of explorative learning.  
 
Technological distance is another independent variable. Technological distance refers to the (lack of) 
overlap between the knowledge base of the focal company and the knowledge base of the partnering 
firms. We use the method developed by Jaffe (1986) to calculate the technological proximity between 
two firms (i and j). Following this method, the technological proximity between two firms is computed 
as the uncentered correlation between their respective vectors of technological capital (measured as the 
cumulative patent applications in technology class k over the five years prior to the investment), Pik 
and Pjk respectively:  
                                                          
4
  Successfully applied patents implies that these patents have been granted. However, we do not allocate a 
patent to the year it was granted, but prefer to allocate it in the year it was applied for because at that time the 













The technological proximity (Tij) measure takes a value between 0 and 1 according to their common 
technological interests. To calculate technological distance, this variable is transformed into a new 
one, which equals1 ijT− . 
 
Control variables 
Firm size. Firms of different sizes innovate differently. In the classical Schumpeterian argument, 
companies’ innovation performance increases more than proportionally with firm size because large 
firms simply having more resources to invest in R&D. Large firms usually have more external 
corporate venturing partnerships and are more centrally positioned in their venturing networks than 
small firms. They also have greater capacity to cooperate in multiple tasks, which is crucial for inter-
organizational learning and absorptive capacity (e.g., Shan, 1990; Powell and Brantley, 1992). Prior 
research has found that large firms are more likely than small ones to undertake exploitative and 
exploratory learning at the same time whereas small firms can maximize innovative performance by 
adopting a focused approach on exploitation or exploration (Beckman et al. 2004, Stuart 2000; Lin et 
al., 2007). Approaching exploration in a different way, Almeida and Kogut (1997) suggest that smaller 
firms explore new technological opportunities that are ignored by larger ones. Small companies may 
be more likely to explore new technological areas with focused strategy in less crowded areas (Lin et 
al., 2007; Almeida and Kogut, 1997). A range of factors including financing, government, regulations, 
and the motives and goals of the entrepreneurs provide conditions for small firms that are more 
amenable to the exploration of new technology (Nooteboom, 1994; Acs and Audretsch, 1990). As a 
consequence small firms are better equipped to explore new technological areas. 
 
These arguments, however, do not focus on the two types of explorative learning the current study 
focuses on. The argument related to the resource constraints does not provide a straightforward 
prediction. In line with the simultaneous development of exploitation and exploration, we could argue 
that large firms will be involved in both types of exploration at the same time because they have no 
resource constraints and it is much easier for them to allocate different activities at different units at 
various levels within an organization (Gupta et al., 2006). In this respect firms have to focus on one of 
the two types of explorations. However, if explorative learning from non-partners involves higher 
levels of uncertainty because the learning process in not embedded in manageable partnership 
relations, then we can argue in line with Almeida and Kogut (1997) that small firms will be relatively 
more inclined to explore from non-partners than from partners. We measure firm size as the natural 
logarithm of sales of the innovating firms. 
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R&D intensity. Prior research has indicated a strong relationship between R&D inputs and innovation, 
and regarded R&D expenditures as a means to maintain absorptive capacity necessary to benefit from 
external technology sourcing (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Consequently, we include R&D 
expenditures as a percentage of sales as a control variable. The control variables size and R&D 
intensity are lagged by one year. 
 
Technological age. Technological age is another firm-level control variable. To measure it, we first 
need to measure the technological newness of a firm’s patent portfolio. Technological newness is 
operationalized in two steps (Van de Vrande et al., 2009). First, we determine the “age of all patent 
classes”. This is calculated as the median of the age of all patents in a patent class in a particular year. 
The age of the patent is the time elapsed between the application year and the year of observation. To 
overcome outlier bias, we use the median age rather than the average to calculate the age. Second, to 
calculate the average technological age of a firm, we multiply the share of patent applications by the 
technology age for each patent class.  We control for the technological age of firms for the following 
reason: If a firm has a relevantly young portfolio of patents, it holds some technologies that are in the 
early phase of the life cycle. These technologies usually entail high technological uncertainty but also 
ample opportunities for technological exploration. As a result, we expect that technological age will be 
negatively related to both types of technological learning. However, there might also be a differential 
effect; Firms that are active in young technological areas may be inclined to learn from technologies of 
start-ups that are active in new technological areas. Since these firms are relatively new innovating 
firms cannot have developed (many) corporate venturing relations with them in the last 5 years.    
 
Several types of dummy variables: The focal innovating firms are companies that are based in 
America, Europe, or Asian. Companies on different continents may have a different attitude towards 
explorative research due to the differences with respect to their cultural, and institutional background. 
Consequently, we use two dummy variables to control for the geographic location of the focal firms. 
(The firms based in America are set as default). We also introduced dummy variable for industries. 
Because the sample consists of firms in both pharmaceutical and chemical industries, we use one 
dummy variable to control for differences in explorative research between the two industries. Finally, 
we included dummy variables to control for the unobserved effects of time in each consecutive year. 
 
3.3 Method 
The dependent variables, explorative learning from partners and non-partners, are count variables. A 
Poisson regression approach provides a natural baseline model for such data (Hausman et al., 1984; 
Henderson and Cockburn, 1996; Long and Freese, 2003). However, Poisson regressions assume that 
the mean and variance of the event count are equal. This assumption is likely to be violated since 
overdispersion usually occurs in patents. Because our data shows significant evidence of 
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overdispersion (i.e. the variance exceeds the mean), a negative binomial regression model is more 
appropriate (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). The negative binomial model for panel data is estimated 
using the XTNBREG command in STATA. 
 
To determine whether a random- or fixed-effects model is more appropriate approach for the analysis, 
we further conducted a Hausman specification test (1978) upon the baseline model. The Hausman test 
was not significant, indicating that it is appropriate to use a random-effects model as an alternative for 
the fixed-effects model. Since random-effects model do not control for time-invariant variables (i.e., 
variables that differ between cases but remain constant over time), we used dummy variables to 
control for unobserved effects of industry and geographic regions.  
 
3.4 Results  
The descriptive statistics and correlations between the variables for the 898 firm-year observations in 
the sample are presented in Table 1.  The correlation between equity alliances and non-equity alliances 
is high (with a coefficient of 0.7145), which may cause multicollinearity problems. For this reason, we 
did not run the full model including all the different governance modes along with the control 
variables. Instead, we ran several models that include only one single governance mode in order to 
examine the effects of each type of governance mode on the two types of explorative learning 
separately. Next, we estimated two proxies of the full model. The first one includes CVC, equity 
alliances and M&As, and the second one model contains CVC, non-equity alliances and M&As, 
besides the control variables (see Table 2, Models 6, 7, 13 and 14; Table 3, Models 20 and 21). In this 
way, equity alliance and non-equity alliances are not included simultaneously in a single model.  
 
 Insert here Tables 1 and 2 
 
Table 2 presents the results of the regression analysis using random-effects negative binomial 
estimations of the two types of exploration. The dependent variable in Models 1 to 7 is explorative 
learning from partners (ELP). The results for explorative learning from non-partners (ELN) are 
represented in Models 8 to 14. The baseline models (respectively Models 1 and 8) include the linear 
effects of the control variables. Hypotheses 1a and 1b predict that the number of corporate venturing 
relationships, including CVC, non-equity alliances, equity alliances, and M&A, are positively 
associated with both types of explorative learning. In Table 2, Models 2 through 5 show that all types 
of the governance modes are positively related to explorative learning from partners (the coefficients 
are significant at various levels). Models 9 through 12 reveal that all types of the governance modes 
have a positive effect on explorative learning from non-partners. The only exception is equity alliances 
(Model 10). As a result, we found strong support for Hypotheses 1a and 1b (except for the effect of 
equity alliances on ELN). This implies that an innovating firm can not only improve its technological 
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exploration by tapping into its external venturing partners’ – CVC, non-equity and equity alliances and 
acquisitions – technology sources but it can also use its contacts with its external venturing 
partnerships to explore new technologies from other firms with whom it has no prior venturing 
relationship. These findings support our claim that innovation partners play a dual role in 
technological exploration.  
 
Hypothesis 1c predicts that the positive effect of the number of corporate venturing relations on 
explorative learning from partners (ELP) is stronger than the effect of the number of corporate 
venturing relations on explorative learning from non-partners (ELN). We find that the coefficients of 
each governance mode in the models explaining ELP are larger than the corresponding ones in the 
models for ELN. Hence, we find empirical support for Hypothesis 1c. This finding implies that the 
positive effect of external venturing partnerships on explorative learning from partners is stronger 
compared to the learning from non-partners. The stronger effect on ELP can be explained through the 
contractual arrangements and the management of the formal agreement(s) between the partners: the 
innovating firm has the possibility to control and monitor the innovation process by means of the 
formal agreements with its partners. Choosing the right governance mode and managing the 
partnership in an appropriate way helps a firm to improve its explorative learning. In the case of ELN 
partners are channels through which an innovating firm can detect other organizations with interesting 
technologies. The fact that partners enhance the innovating firm’s ability to detect new or relevant 
technologies in other organizations is a side effect of the formal agreements with their partners. The 
innovating firm cannot force its partners to reveal their knowledge about technologies developed by 
companies that are not partners of the former. Rather, companies learn about these opportunities 
beyond the existing network through informal contacts, trust building and socialization with their 
venturing partners (Nooteboom, 1996, 2002). As a result, it is not surprising that the effect of 
venturing relations on ELP is stronger than their effect on ELN. 
 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b predict the relationship between levels of integration in the governance modes 
of external corporate venturing and explorative learning with partners and non-partners from two 
seemingly conflicting perspectives. To test these two hypotheses, we included different types of 
governance modes into the semi-full models of Table 3. In Models 6 (for ELP) and 13 (for ELN), 
CVCs, equity alliances and M&As are included. Alternatively, in Model 7 (for ELP) and 14 (for 
ELN), we inserted CVCs, non-equity alliances and M&As. The results in Models 6 and 7 show that 
more integrated governance modes have a stronger positive impact on ELP. The results in Models 13 
and 14 also confirm that more integrated the governance modes have a stronger positive effect on ELN 
(except for equity alliances in Model 13, β= -0,001, p>0.1). However, the effect is not as pronounced 
as the results in Model 7 for ELP. In sum, based on the results in Models 6, 7, 13 and 14, it is safe to 
conclude that M&As have a stronger effect on both types of explorative learning than alliances, and 
 23
alliances are in turn more appropriate for ELP and ELN than CVC. In other words, we found support 
in favor of the traditional governance perspective, which argues that the risky and uncertain nature of 
exploration requires more integrated governance modes. Innovating firms need some specific 
investment to develop mutual understanding, to cross-cognitive distance (Nooteboom, 1999). Hence, 
we find empirical support for Hypothesis 2b.  
 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that the technological distance between the focal innovating firm and its external 
corporate venturing partners has a curvilinear effect (inverted U-shape) on ELP. To test this 
hypothesis, we introduced a linear and a squared term of technological distance into the models. Table 
3 represents the results of the regression analysis using random-effects negative binomial estimations 
of ELP. First, Model 15 – which is comparable with Model 1 in Table 2 - includes all the control 
variables, technological distance and its squared term, without the governance modes variables. In 
Models 15 to 21, the coefficients of the linear term of technological distance are positive and those of 
the squared term negative. The impact is always highly significant (p<0.01). These results support 
Hypothesis 3. They confirm the results of prior studies on the role of technological distance on 
innovation (Nooteboom et al., 2007; Van de Vrande, 2007). More interestingly, when the squared 
term of technological distance is added into the models explaining ELP in Table 3, the coefficients of 
governance modes in Model 16 till 19 are positive and significant (except for equity alliances). 
Moreover, in Models 20 and 21, where we include several external venturing modes simultaneously, 
the results are similar to the ones in the corresponding models of Table 2 (Models 6 and 7). Hence, the 
results shown in Table 4 further confirm the empirical support for Hypothesis 1a, 1b and 2b.  
 
Insert here Table 3 
 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that the technological distance between the innovating firm and its external 
corporate venturing partners has negative effect on ELN5. In Table 2, the Models 8 till 14 show that 
technological distance has a negative effect on explorative learning from non-partners. This implies 
that firms that establish ties with large average technological distance with its venturing partners are 
less successful in learning from non-partners. Hence, the results clearly support Hypothesis 4.  
To summarize, the results of the empirical analysis support Hypothesis 1a, 1b, 2b, 3 and 4. The 
empirical support for these hypotheses leads to the following conclusions. First, corporate venturing, 
including CVC, non-equity alliances, equity alliances, and M&A, leads to more explorative learning 
from partners as well as from non-partners. However, the positive effect of external venturing 
partnerships on learning from non-partners is less pronounced comparing to their effects on learning 
from partners (ELP). Secondly, the argument that the risky and uncertain nature of exploration 
                                                          
5
 We ran some regressions explaining explorative learning from non-partners including the squared term of 
technological distance. The coefficients were not statistically significant.   
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requires integrated governance modes is supported by the fact that more integrated modes of external 
technology venturing than less integrated ones: M&As are more appropriate for both types of 
explorative learning than alliances and alliances are in turn more effective than CVCs. Finally, 
technological distance between the focal innovating firm and its external corporate venturing partners 
has an inverted U-shaped effect on explorative learning from partners while there is a negative effect 
of this variable on explorative learning from non-partners.  
 
Finally, it is also interesting to have a look at several control  variables in Tables 2 and 3. Firm size 
has  a positive and significant effect in all models for ELP as well as for EBP. Recall that firm size is 
measured as the natural logarithm of sales so that the coefficient in a negative binomial regression 
model can be considered as elasticity. The fact that the coefficients of firm size consistently are 
positive but less than one (β < 1) implies that smaller firms are relatively more innovative than larger 
firms in both types of explorative search. This is consistent with previous research findings (Acs and 
Audretsch, 1990). 
 
Next, the coefficients of R&D intensity are positive and significant in all models for both types of 
explorative learning (except for Model 7 in Table 2 and Models 20 and 21 in Table 3), which suggests 
that R&D investments facilitate firms’ explorative search. While the coefficients of firm size are more 
or less comparable in size for ELP and ELN, those of R&D intensity are substantially larger for ELP 
compared to ELN. The stronger relation between R&D investments and ELP is not surprising. When 
firms establish partnerships, explorative learning from the partners will most likely increase when the 
partnering firms are investing more in collaborative research. In the case of explorative learning from 
non-partners more R&D investments do not necessarily facilitate learning from companies that are no 
innovation partners of the focal company. to manage the outcome as there is no formal agreement. If 
firms invest for instance more in their scouting of new technologies they may find relevant 
innovations and ideas that can foster ELN.  However, the relationship between R&D investments and 
ELN will be weaker compared to the case where a company invests in a particular corporate venturing 
relation with one of its innovation partners.   
  
 
4. Discussion and conclusion 
This study investigates the dual role of external corporate venturing, including corporate venture 
capital (CVC), alliances and mergers and acquisitions (M&A), on two different types of exploratory 
learning – exploration from partners (ELP) and exploration from non-partners (ELN). They represent 
two different types of innovation strategies that tackle the problem of local search in a different way. 
On the one hand, innovating firms may avoid local search by learning from their corporate venturing 
partners. In this case, the knowledge within the venturing partners is the main reason why the focal 
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firm sets up a relationship with them. They may own complementary technologies, be technological 
leaders in emerging technologies, co-create highly explorative research in new research areas, etc…  
As a result, the venturing relations can be considered as ‘pipes’ through which information and 
knowledge flows between the innovating firm and its partners.  
 
On the other hand, companies can avoid local search by exploring technologies developed in 
organizations with whom they had no prior external corporate venturing relationships. The extant 
literature has studied the role of external venturing partnerships on explorative learning from partners 
in detail, but it has to a large extent overlooked the role of technology partners in learning from other 
companies with whom the innovating company has no prior venturing connections. We argued that 
external corporate venturing partnerships not only give the innovating firm access to the technology 
and know-how of its partners, but they also facilitate the exploration of the innovating firm in 
technological areas in which neither this focal firm nor its partners have expertise. In this way, 
venturing partners might be considered as ‘prisms’, acting as reference systems to identify the 
location, usefulness, relevance and complementarity of other technology sources. Similarly, the 
innovation firm can profit from its relations with different venturing partners as they may increase its 
reputation in the eyes of third parties (Podolny, 2001; Zuckerman, 1999, 2000; Stuart et al, 1999). 
 
The empirical results of this study provide support for the idea that external corporate venturing 
partners not only give the focal firm access to the technological capabilities of its partners, but they are 
also instrumental in the focal firm’s search to explore technologies beyond the current network of 
partners. In the first case (ELP), the expertise of the partners is determining the explorative learning of 
the focal firm. In the last case (ELN), it is the reputation of the firm’s partners and their knowledge 
about who they know, that leads to better innovative performance. This confirms the dual role of 
external corporate venturing partnerships.  
 
Next, we found that the positive effect of external venturing partnerships on explorative learning from 
non-partners is less pronounced than the one on learning from partners. This outcome is not surprising 
since exploratory learning from partners is based on direct information flows between the firms and its 
partners and they can shape their governance of their relationship in order to maximize the explorative 
learning. Partners help the focal firms also to explore beyond the scope of the venturing partner 
network. The risks associated with this type of learning cannot be directly controlled by the 
governance mechanisms of the venturing relationships. Furthermore, we found that the risky and 
uncertain nature of explorative learning requires highly integrated governance modes. In other words, 
M&As are more appropriate for ELP and ELN than alliances both types of explorative learning, and 
alliances are, in turn, more appropriate than CVC. Finally, the increase of technological distance 
between the focal innovating firm and its external corporate venturing partners from a low to moderate 
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level will enhance learning from partners ELP, while the increase from a moderate to excessively high 
level will on the contrary hinder it. Our findings also suggest that the increase of technological 
distance between the focal innovating firm and its venturing partners is associated with a decrease of 
ELN, which implies that specific investments in the venturing relationships and maintaining sufficient 
technological proximity are important to absorb other types of external knowledge sources.  
 
This study contributes to the innovation management literature in several ways. First, we refine the 
concept of exploration: we explicitly distinguished between explorative learning based on the 
knowledge of partners and non-partners To overcome the local search of exploiting its own internal 
knowledge, a firm can source new knowledge from its venturing partners. Firms can of course also 
source from other organizations with whom they have had no venturing relations. We explored how 
venture partners play a dual role in these two types of explorative learning. In explorative learning 
from partners, the technological capabilities of the venture partners are a major driven to reach out. In 
contrast, partners are also instrumental when an innovating firm is searching for new knowledge 
sources beyond the venturing partner network. In this case, partners help the innovating firm to get 
acquainted to new technological areas by connecting it to organizations that are active in these fields. 
Hence, partners exchange and co-create knowledge with the focal firm through venturing relationships 
but they also help it in reaching out to organizations with other technologies. Second, the positive 
effect of the network of external corporate venturing partners on is stronger on learning from partners 
compared to learning from non-partners. In explorative learning from partners the venturing 
relationships are conduits of knowledge and the governance of these relations enables the partners to 
optimize the learning process. In learning from non-partners, in contrast, partners help to reach out the 
focal firm to new technologies. This is a rather indirect side effect of having a network of partners. As 
a result, learning from non-partners is more risky and uncertain in terms of return.  Third, we also 
explored the relationship between the level of integration of the venturing governance modes and the 
two types of explorative learning. We found that highly integrated modes are improving both types of 
exploration. Finally, we analyzed how technological distance has an impact on the two types of 
exploratory learning. The results indicate that learning from partners is maximized for intermediate 
technological distances. This result is in line with earlier findings (Nooteboom, 2000a; Nooteboom et 
al. 2007). In contrast, learning from non-partners requires that the average technological distance 
between the focal firm and its partners is relatively small. That implies that partners with strongly 
overlapping technological profiles are more interesting as referrals. They are more efficient in helping 
the firm to reach out to new technological areas. Further research should investigate whether this is 
because communication is easier when partners have similar technological backgrounds or whether 




This study also provides researchers with some new ideas for future research about organizational 
boundary spanning exploration. The first interesting issue is whether there are complementarities or 
tradeoffs between the two types of explorative learning. Tradeoffs might be induced by budget 
restrictions and inertia through path dependent learning. The two types of explorative learning may 
also be complementary because management might eventually benefit from strategically balancing 
different types of exploration. From a resource-based view, resource allocation is a strategic choice 
when available resources in a firm are limited. Resource allocation process usually needs budgeting, 
which inevitably involves explicit rankings and comparisons. Some projects are deemed more 
important than others and are awarded a larger share of available funds and management attention 
(Simons, 2006). Suppose a firm intends to enhance innovative performance by exploring new 
technology opportunities from external sources, top management might downplay learning from non-
partners in favor of exploration from venturing partners because of budget restrictions.. In other 
words, different projects, even if they are for the same goal of learning, compete for resources and 
management attention. Tradeoffs may be also induced through organizational inertia.  The outcome of 
a prior strategic action will reinforce and shape new choices according to the organizational learning 
literature (Levitt and March, 1988). Choices that lead to positive outcomes are reinforced, while the 
choices that lead to negative outcome will be avoided. Due to this path dependence in decision 
making, we propose that firms that gain positive experience in explorative learning from partners will 
continue to invest  in the-is type of learning and pay less attention to learning from non partners, and 
vice versa. Finally, the two types of exploration might also be complements. As firms have to balance 
exploitation and exploration (March, 1991; Lin et al. 2007), they may eventually also benefit from 
balancing two types of exploration. Their focus and objectives are different and they jointly leverage 
external venture relationships, increasing in this way the effectiveness of their innovation process.  
 
Other opportunities may be related to the operationalization of the two types of exploration. We have 
been using both concepts in an exclusive way. Once a patent cites prior patents of partners it is 
considered as learning from partners, irrespective of the number of citations to non-partners. In this 
way, the analysis can be improved by developing more sophisticated, continuous variables that range 
between 100% partner citations and 100% non-partner citations. Our current study on exploration can 
be easily extended to exploration to both organizational and technological boundary spanning 
(Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2003). We only focused on exploration as an organizational boundary 
spanning activity. Including technological boundary-spanning as another dimension will certainly 
enrich the analysis. Finally, extending the types of relationships between partners (e.g. licensing, arm’s 
length R&D-contracting, patent search, informal / personal contacts, etc.) may of course also help in 
getting a clearer picture how external sources of knowledge enhance firms’ explorative learning. In a 
similar vein, one can introduce partners’ partners and check whether the “non-partners” are indirectly 
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linked to the focal firm or not. As shown in the alliance literature (Ahuja, 2000), a firm’s partners’ 
partners may also be an important source of external knowledge  
 
This study also has several managerial implications. First, managers that want to encourage 
explorative learning should establish external venturing relations for two reasons. Partners can be 
interesting because of their technology base, but partners are also helpful in looking beyond the 
network of partners extending a firm’s explorative learning into technologies in which both the firm 
and its partners have not prior expertise.  This dual role of partners in explorative learning is not well 
understood, as firms establish partnerships mainly to learn directly from their partners. Managers 
should take into account that in establishing relations with partners, they will get informed about 
technologies, business opportunities, and organizations that might be interesting for a firm’s 
explorative learning. Partners with a similar technology portfolio and with whom a firm has strong ties 
 are in that respect more interesting than partners that have a complete different technology base or 
who are linking through weak ties. We hope our attempt in this study to analyze the dual role of 
partners explorative learning may provide new insights for the literature on inter-organizational 
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Figure 1:  Implications of cognitive distance on novelty and absorptive capacity (source: adapted 
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Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. EFP 1             
2. EBP 0.5205 1            
3. Firm size 0.2851    0.2685    1           
4. R&D intensity -0.0421 -0.0968   -0.3448    1          
5. Technological age 0.0207    0.0384    0.0233   -0.2443    1         
6. Dummy Europe 0.0238    0.1909   -0.1737    0.0082    0.1648    1        
7. Dummy Japan 0.1128   -0.0583    0.7589   -0.0456   -0.1615   -0.3356    1       
8. Dummy Industry -0.2035   -0.1776   -0.0311    0.2820   -0.4182   0.1153    0.1423    1      
9. Tech. distance -0.0657    0.1216   -0.1090   -0.1061    0.2131    0.0614    -0.1884   -0.1906    1     
10. CVC 0.1085    0.1739   -0.0191   -0.0080   -0.0778    -0.0538   -0.1319   -0.0584    0.0785   1    
11. Non-equity alliances 0.6676    0.4754    0.1231   -0.0414    0.0138   0.1095   -0.1131   -0.1548    -0.0007    0.2749    1   
12. Equity alliances 0.6511    0.4858    0.1854   -0.0643    0.0403    0.0409   -0.0599   -0.2120    0.0059    0.2925    0.7145    1  
13. M&As  0.2148    0.3625    0.0107   -0.1404    0.2029    0.1915   -0.3121   -0.2259    0.1615    0.3739    0.3574    0.3650 1 
Mean 11.8207 57.2861 9.7471 0.1738 10.2763 0.2984 0.2093 0.4788 0.7159 0.7438 6.6748 2.8596 2.9365
s.d.  51.5243 67.2342 2.1310 0.1738 1.9784 0.4578 0.4070 0.4998 0.1882 2.8199          12.8809   4.9199 3.7388
 
N=898,   
Dummy year variables are not listed in the table.  
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Table 2: Random-effects negative binomial estimations for EFP and EBP (with the linear effects of control variables in the baseline model) 
Models 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
 ELP ELP ELP ELP ELP ELP ELP ELN ELN ELN ELN ELN ELN ELN 
Size 0.596 0.576 0.554 0.503 0.495 0.411 0.375 0.408 0.403 0.422 0.401 0.384 0.388 0.371 
 (0.101)*** (0.101)*** (0.100)*** (0.103)*** (0.104)*** (0.103)*** (0.102)*** (0.040)*** (0.040)*** (0.042)*** (0.041)*** (0.040)*** (0.043)*** (0.041)*** 
R&D 1.522 1.517 1.348 1.227 1.328 1.031 0.984 0.744 0.738 0.79 0.729 0.69 0.713 0.668 
 (0.623)** (0.628)** (0.613)** (0.615)** (0.625)** (0.612)* (0.604) (0.229)*** (0.229)*** (0.232)*** (0.230)*** (0.226)*** (0.231)*** (0.227)*** 
Europe 0.222 0.267 0.139 0.275 0.214 0.061 0.175 0.077 0.099 0.081 0.062 0.025 0.053 -0.009 
 -0.242 -0.244 -0.237 -0.234 -0.238 -0.235 -0.229 -0.132 -0.133 -0.132 -0.131 -0.131 -0.133 -0.133 
Japan -3.878 -3.728 -3.686 -3.579 -3.263 -2.905 -2.884 -1.764 -1.726 -1.813 -1.703 -1.706 -1.703 -1.608 
 (0.569)*** (0.573)*** (0.561)*** (0.559)*** (0.589)*** (0.573)*** (0.559)*** (0.248)*** (0.249)*** (0.252)*** (0.248)*** (0.246)*** (0.251)*** (0.246)*** 
Pharma. Ind. -1.428 -1.402 -1.307 -1.284 -1.454 -1.272 -1.275 -0.143 -0.143 -0.166 -0.111 -0.112 -0.127 -0.072 
 (0.228)*** (0.229)*** (0.231)*** (0.227)*** (0.229)*** (0.229)*** (0.224)*** -0.123 -0.123 -0.124 -0.124 -0.123 -0.124 -0.123 
Tech. age -0.077 -0.06 -0.075 -0.054 -0.069 -0.062 -0.038 -0.031 -0.028 -0.031 -0.025 -0.033 -0.03 -0.025 
 (0.043)* -0.044 (0.043)* -0.043 -0.043 -0.044 -0.045 (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.013)* (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.013)* 
Tech. distance -1.372 -1.422 -1.07 -1.001 -1.739 -1.351 -1.364 -0.225 -0.232 -0.245 -0.203 -0.275 -0.285 -0.256 
 (0.423)*** (0.423)*** (0.448)** (0.443)** (0.439)*** (0.456)*** (0.457)*** (0.118)* (0.117)** (0.118)** (0.119)* (0.119)** (0.119)** (0.120)** 
CVC  0.017    0.001 -0.01  0.008    0.006 0.001 
  (0.009)*    -0.009 -0.009  (0.004)**    -0.004 -0.004 
Equity alliances   0.005   0.008    -0.002   -0.001  
   (0.002)**   (0.002)***    -0.001   -0.001  
M&A    0.02  0.047 0.059    0.007  0.015 0.022 
    (0.006)***  (0.010)*** (0.010)***    (0.003)***  (0.005)*** (0.005)*** 
Non-equity alliances    0.038  0.032     0.018  0.01 
     (0.009)***  (0.006)***     (0.005)***  (0.003)*** 
Constant -2.645 -2.684 -2.735 -2.594 -1.562 -1.534 -1.416 -0.793 -0.793 -0.86 -0.846 -0.533 -0.588 -0.57 
 (1.055)** (1.058)** (1.039)*** (1.058)** -1.112 -1.099 -1.105 (0.392)** (0.390)** (0.397)** (0.396)** -0.395 -0.404 -0.398 
log lik -1427.57 -1425.87 -1425.32 -1422.07 -1419.57 -1413.57 -1406.95 -3761.79 -3760.04 -3761.02 -3758.73 -3755.57 -3754.62 -3749.39 
lr-test  3.28* 4.38** 10.88 *** 15.88 *** 27.87 *** 41.41 ***  3.51* 1.55 6.13** 12.46 *** 14.36 *** 24.81 *** 
N=898  
Dummy variables of year is included but not listed in the table 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 3: Random-effects negative binomial estimations for ELP and ELN (with the squared term of ‘technological 
distance’ in the baseline model) 
 
Models 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
 ELP ELP ELP ELP ELP ELP ELP 
Size 0.573 0.553 0.558 0.506 0.467 0.404 0.379 
 (0.101)*** (0.102)*** (0.103)*** (0.104)*** (0.105)*** (0.106)*** (0.104)*** 
R&D 1.336 1.334 1.281 1.156 1.105 0.916 0.927 
 (0.604)** (0.606)** (0.608)** (0.604)* (0.608)* -0.613 -0.598 
Europe 0.21 0.267 0.184 0.251 0.196 0.119 0.161 
 -0.241 -0.244 -0.241 -0.233 -0.239 -0.239 -0.231 
Japan -3.614 -3.454 -3.553 -3.344 -2.987 -2.726 -2.571 
 (0.579)*** (0.583)*** (0.582)*** (0.573)*** (0.597)*** (0.592)*** (0.575)*** 
Pharma.Ind. -1.506 -1.484 -1.459 -1.375 -1.561 -1.413 -1.378 
 (0.227)*** (0.228)*** (0.237)*** (0.228)*** (0.230)*** (0.235)*** (0.226)*** 
Tech.age -0.089 -0.072 -0.088 -0.065 -0.084 -0.072 -0.043 
 (0.044)** -0.044 (0.044)** -0.045 (0.044)* -0.045 -0.045 
Technological distance 11.229 11.375 10.833 10.905 11.807 10.784 11.434 
 (2.976)*** (2.991)*** (3.036)*** (3.037)*** (2.984)*** (3.036)*** (3.058)*** 
(Technological distance)2 -9.409 -9.554 -9.034 -8.936 -10.2 -9.227 -9.677 
 (2.135)*** (2.144)*** (2.213)*** (2.187)*** (2.148)*** (2.212)*** (2.212)*** 
CVC  0.018    0.005 -0.006 
  (0.008)**    -0.008 -0.008 
Equity alliances   0.001   0.005  
   -0.002   (0.002)**  
M&A    0.015  0.047 0.061 
    (0.006)***  (0.010)*** (0.010)*** 
Non-equity alliances     0.043  0.027 
     (0.009)***  (0.006)*** 
Constant -6.183 -6.302 -6.061 -6.097 -5.24 -4.877 -5.213 
 (1.381)*** (1.392)*** (1.387)*** (1.416)*** (1.416)*** (1.427)*** (1.461)*** 
Log likelihood -1415.17 -1413.18 -1414.98 -1411.73 -1405.06 -1402.64 -1394.99 
lr-test  3.98** 0.39 6.88*** 20.24*** 25.06*** 40.36*** 
 
N=898  
Dummy variables of year is included but not listed in the table 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
